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1. Introduction
Korea undertook a strong drive for financial liberalisation and market opening from the early 1990s.
The structural weaknesses brought about by high costs and low efficiency in its 30-year process of
concentrated growth, however, meant that its financial and economic system had become destabilised
and barely able to stand the associated strains.
Most notably, in 1997, a string of large corporate insolvencies and the consequent rapid build-up of
financial institutions bad loans undermined their soundness and threatened the systemic health of the
financial system. Furthermore, the negative effects of the southeast Asian currency crisis deepened
foreign investors misgivings about the health of the Korean economy. Accordingly, there was a large
net outflow of foreign portfolio capital. Korea found itself in crisis, lacking sufficient foreign currency
liquidity to meet its maturing liabilities, following a sharp decline in its foreign exchange reserves from
early November 1997.
This left the government no option but to turn to the IMF for standby credit. An emergency package
was agreed upon on 3 December 1997, under which Korea began an economic reform programme
focused on macroeconomic stability and reform of its financial and corporate sectors as well as its
labour market. The drive for financial sector restructuring focused on a shakeout among financial
institutions, the clearing out of bad loans, the tightening of prudential regulations, the heightening of
transparency of financial information, and the reorganisation of corporate governance at financial
institutions.
2. Structural reforms in the financial sector
2.1 Closures, purchase and assumption transactions, and mergers
The government adopted a policy of closing down financial institutions which were no longer viable
because of an overhang of non-performing loans (NPLs), while inducing an early normalisation of
those still viable through injection of public funds under the condition of their own intensive self-rescue
efforts.
During the financial crisis period, the top priority in financial sector restructuring was given to the
earliest possible resolution of unsound financial institutions. The government acted swiftly and
decisively to close down financial institutions deemed non-viable after an exhaustive review of their
financial situations.
At the end of June 1998, five banks with capital adequacy ratios below the 8% BIS guideline were
forced to exit the market through a purchase and assumption formula. Nine banks merged to form
four successor banks in 1999, and two were merged to form one successor bank in July 2000. As a
result, the total number of banks in Korea had been reduced from 33 to 22 by the end of 2000.
In the case of non-bank financial institutions, 21 merchant banking corporations, six securities
companies, eight securities investment trust companies, and 12 insurance companies had been
closed down through exits or mergers by the end of August 2000.
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Table 1
Changes in the number of financial institutions
Type of resolutionAs at
end-1997
(a)1 Exit
2 Merger3 Total (b)
Newly
established
(c)
As at
Aug
2000
(a-b+c)
Banks 33 5 6 11  22
Merchant banking
corporations 30 18 3 21  9
Securities companies 36 6  6 13 43
Securities investment trust
companies 31 7 1 8 4 27
Insurance companies 45 5 7 12 1 34
Mutual savings and finance
companies 231 52 17 69  1734
Credit unions 1,666 215 69 284  1,3914
Total 2,072 308 103 411 18 1,679
1  Excluding bridge financial institutions and branches of foreign institutions.  2  Including revocations of licence, bankruptcies
and liquidations.  3  Represents the number of financial institutions ceasing to exist following mergers.
4  Number of institutions at the end of March 2000.
Table 2
Consolidation in the banking sector: June 1998 to March 2001
Type Contents Time
Purchase and
assumption
Five insolvent banks were ordered to be taken over by healthy banks
through a purchase and assumption formula;
Daedong Bank → Kookmin Bank
Dongnam Bank→ Korea Housing & Commercial Bank
Dongwha Bank → Shinhan Bank
Chungchung Bank → Hana Bank
Kyungki Bank → KorAm Bank Jun 1998
Merger Government-led mergers
Korea Commercial Bank, Hanil Bank → Hanvit Bank Jan 1999
Kookmin Bank, Korea Long-Term Credit Bank → Kookmin Bank Jan 1999
Chohung Bank, Chungbuk Bank → Chohung Bank May 1999
Chohung Bank, Kangwon Bank → Chohung Bank Sep 1999
Voluntary merger
Hana Bank, Boram Bank → Hana Bank Jan 1999
Sell-off Korea First Bank → Newbridge Capital (US financial consortium) Dec 1999
Government-
initiated financial
holding company
Hanvit Bank, Peace Bank, Kwangju Bank, Kyongnam Bank, Hanaro
Investment Banking, nine member-bank subsidiaries → Woori Financial
Holding Company Apr 2001
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2.2 Injection of public funds
In the process of the sweeping financial sector restructuring, the government had to inject a huge
amount of public funds into commercial banks through two government agencies - Korea Deposit
Insurance Corporation (KDIC) and Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO).
The total amount of financial support devoted to financial restructuring stood at 123 trillion won at the
end of 2000. Out of this total amount, 48 trillion won was used for recapitalisation, 42 trillion won for
the purchase of NPLs and 19 trillion won for the payment of deposit insurance claims.
In order to support financial restructuring, the government raised a total amount of 104 trillion won of
public funds (including 40 trillion won for supporting the second round of financial restructuring) by
issuing government-guaranteed bonds - Deposit Insurance Fund Bonds by KDIC and Non-performing
Loans Management Fund Bonds by KAMCO. Out of the total amount of 104 trillion, about 73 trillion
won had been used by the end of 2000. The government contributed a total of 19 trillion won from
fiscal resources.
Table 3
Public funds injected into the banking system (trillion won)
Source Support type Nov 1997-Dec 1998 1999 2000 Total
KDIC Total, of which: 26 28 23 78
 Recapitalisation 6 16 14 36
 Compensation of losses 7 4 1 12
 Purchase of distressed assets  3 6 9
 Insurance claim payment 12 5 2 19
 Loans issued 2 0  2
KAMCO Purchase of NPLs 12 3 12 27
Fiscal Total, of which: 16 2  19
resources  Recapitalisation 11 2  12
 Purchase of subordinated
debentures 6 1  6
TOTAL 55 33 35 123
Fiscal support to financial institutions for recapitalisation was inevitable and necessary in order to
ensure the soundness of the financial system and to prevent systemic risk in the process of financial
sector restructuring. As a result of this provision of government support, eight of the 17 commercial
banks were temporarily nationalised. However, the government is committed to the withdrawal of its
involvement in the commercial banking system.
The government sold its majority stake in Korea First Bank to Newbridge Capital, a US investment
fund, in December 1999. This represented the first foreign ownership of a Korean commercial bank.
As for Seoul Bank, a new chief executive officer has been appointed, and the bank is being groomed
for privatisation in consultation with Deutsche Bank. Once a management turnaround has been
achieved, the government intends to sell Seoul Bank to foreign investors by June 2001 as originally
planned, If the sale does not happen by that time, the government plans to place Seoul Bank under a
state-run financial holding company, Woori Financial Holding.
As for other temporarily nationalised commercial banks, the government will sell off its shares in them
in steps from the first half of 2002, in accordance with its memorandum on economic policies agreed
with the IMF. Government-owned preferred stock is being redeemed.
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Table 4
Status of state-ownership in commercial banks (% at end-20001)
Bank Government2 KDIC3 Foreigners4 Largest shareholder
Hanvit  100.0  KDIC 100.0
Chohung  80.1 0.2 KDIC 80.1
Nationwide
commercial
banks
Korea First 3.1 45.9 51.0 Newbridge Capital 51.0
Seoul  100.0  KDIC 100.0
Korea
Exchange
 35.95 (43.2)6 26.4 (34.2) Commerz AG 23.6 (32.6)
Kookmin 6.5 (5.7)  (9.4) 58.2 (51.3) Goldman Sachs 11.1 (9.8)
Housing &
Commercial
14.5 (9.4)  (10.6) 66.4 (43.0) Bank of New York 15.4 (9.8)
Shinhan  ()  (18.3) 49.5 (40.4) Korean residents in Japan
17.9 (14.8)
KorAm 2.3 (1.7)  (18.5) 61.5 (48.6) Korea Investment 17.9 (14.9)
Hana 4.2 (2.7)  (35.0) 32.2 (20.9) Allianz 12.5 (KDIC 35.0)
Peace  100.0  KDIC 100.0
Taegu 0.1  0.8 Samsung Life Insurance 8.1Regional
banks Pusan   7.0 Lotte affiliates 14.2
Kwangju  100.0  KDIC 100.0
Cheju  100.0  KDIC 100.0
Cheonbuk   0.1 Samyang affiliates 10.9
Kyoungnam  100.0  KDIC 100.0
1  Figures in parentheses represent percentage of shareholding calculated by including preferred stocks issued in the
process of financial reforms in 1998-99.   2  Includes government-invested institutions (except financial institutions) in which
the government holds a stake of at least 50%, or of which it holds less than half the equity but has provided funding support.
3  Refers to Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, which was established in June 1996 for the purpose of operating a
deposit insurance system.   4  Includes portfolio investment.   5  The Bank of Korea 17.8%, Export-Import Bank of Korea
16.2%.   6  The Bank of Korea 10.7%, Export-Import Bank of Korea 32.5%.
3. The second round of the financial restructuring plan (since end-2000)
In overcoming the financial crisis, efforts had been exerted to prevent systemic breakdown and to form
the framework for establishing a market economy, as well as to raise external creditworthiness by
pushing forward with the first-round financial restructuring process.
In spite of all efforts in the course of the first round reforms from January 1998 to August 2000,
considerable uncertainty about the financial system remained. Most banks that had received public
funds, and some other banks judged viable two years ago, could not turn themselves around. The
outcome was that many banks found themselves still in a precarious position, and additional injection
of public funds became unavoidable.
Accordingly, the government undertook the second stage of financial restructuring with a focus on
strengthening the competitiveness of the domestic financial industry by clearing up bad assets such as
NPLs, and implementing forward-looking reforms based on the results of the initial financial
restructuring.
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From the beginning of 2001, major changes have been taking place in the banking sector as the
second round of financial restructuring starts. The second round has three aspects; placing banks
under government-led financial holding companies, merging unhealthy provincial banks with healthy
ones and allowing mergers among healthy banks. At the end of 2000, the government raised an
additional 40 trillion won of public funds to support the second round of restructuring, having used up
64 trillion won of the public funds raised for supporting the first stage of restructuring from November
1997 to August 2000.
3.1 Introduction of financial holding companies
In the past, financial institutions in Korea were prohibited from setting up holding companies. This was
because areas of financial activity were strictly demarcated among financial institutions and there were
fears that financial concentration through holding companies would hamper the effectiveness of the
financial market, and also that the unsoundness of one affiliated company would easily infect other
affiliates.
The government, however, changed its policy and lowered the barriers to business diversification by
financial institutions, showing a positive attitude toward financial holding companies. It is hoped that
the establishment of financial holding companies will have numerous positive effects, such as
enhancing credit in the financial market through facilitating economies of scale and scope, lowering
financing costs, cutting the duplication of investment in information technology etc.
There is also some truth in the argument that it was the commercial banks' reluctance to participate in
mergers that led the financial authorities to adopt a positive attitude toward financial holding
companies, considering them another strong tool in effecting the consolidation of financial institutions.
Staff resistance to takeover is less when the takeover is performed by a holding company than when it
is a consequence of a merger of two banks.
In October 2000, the Korean National Assembly passed the Financial Holding Company Act, and the
possibility of creating financial holding companies is now open, although there are still comparatively
severe restrictions and government authorisation is needed when one is to be set up.
On 23 March 2001, the Financial Supervisory Commission, the state financial sector regulator,
approved the establishment of the state-run financial holding company, Woori Financial Holding. The
new company was officially inaugurated on 2 April 2001. Financial organisations under the Woori
umbrella include four nationalised banks - Hanvit Bank, Peace Bank, Kwangju Bank and Kyongnam
Bank - along with their nine subsidiaries, and Hanaro Investment Banking. These banks were all
judged not to be self-sustainable. Consequently the government again injected sufficient public funds
into them at the end of 2000 to bring their capital ratios up to 10% and pushed ahead with their
rehabilitation through a financial holding company scheme.
To promote increased consolidation in the domestic banking sector, the government may also offer
priority approval to sound banks and regional banks if they are willing to integrate voluntarily as a
financial holding company. Banks wishing to join Woori will be included in it if this will contribute to the
formation of a large and financially sound leading bank.
Shinhan Bank, one of the nations leading commercial banks, is expected to set up its own holding
company as soon as May 2001. Its five existing subsidiaries and Cheju Bank, a financially troubled
local commercial bank, will be brought under the holding company.
3.2 Mergers between sound banks
During the second stage of financial reform and restructuring now under way, additional mergers
between sound banks and the formation of further financial holding companies are expected as banks
continue to seek to improve their levels of financial soundness and competitiveness.
Negotiations are already under way between two healthy banks; on 22 December 2000, Kookmin
Bank and Housing & Commercial Bank, two of the healthiest domestic banks, officially announced that
they had agreed to merge to create a new bank on 30 June 2001. Final merger negotiations are
currently in progress. Shinhan and Cheju are currently involved in discussions with a view to
consolidation. Other healthy banks are also being encouraged to consider mergers.
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4. Main features of consolidation and recent developments
4.1 Mergers pursued as a means of financial reform
As stated above, mergers have been the typical form of consolidation in the Korean banking industry.
This is because the top priority in financial sector restructuring was originally given to the resolution of
unsound financial institutions. It can be said, therefore, that most of the recent mergers in the Korean
financial sector had nothing to do with voluntary restructuring in a true sense, although their aim was
the same: to improve individual institutions' competitiveness or their financial status. In line with this,
mergers undertaken as the main tool in the resolution of unsound financial institutions were carried out
mainly on the purchase and assumption basis.
During the first round of financial restructuring, the government implicitly expressed its hope that
voluntary mergers among banks would occur, and announced that preferential tax treatment would be
given in cases of mergers. To induce more mergers, it revised the relevant legislation to permit any
financial institution to either maintain its existing form, or convert itself into a different type of financial
institution through merger with a financial institution of a similar or different type, or convert itself into a
different type of financial institution. This paves the way for mergers between banks and non-bank
financial institutions.
The government believes that large banks have many competitive advantages in the new financial
environment, in which universal and internet banking are flourishing while the internationalisation of
the domestic financial market accelerates. It also expects that mergers will increase the efficiency of
bank management as a result of downsizing to eliminate the duplicate organisational structures and
staff.
4.2 The first round of restructuring cannot be judged a success
Though huge amounts of public money were injected into troubled financial institutions in the course of
the first stage of financial sector restructuring during 1998 to 2000, a few banks still had substantial
levels of bad loans and failed to achieve the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio. This has forced the
government to undertake the second stage of financial restructuring.
Merged banks have not pursued the hoped-for synergies. The management performance of Hanvit
Bank, the result of merging two banks with equal shares, has been very disappointing. An additional
3 trillion won of public money was injected into Hanvit Bank to clean it up, despite its having already
been recapitalised with a previous 3 trillion won of public money.
4.3 Mergers among good banks initiated in recent months
Most of the mergers during the first round of the financial restructuring process occurred in response
to government prodding. Individual banks were reluctant to merge, and worried about severe staff
layoffs in the event of absorption. Every bank considering a merger wanted to be the initiator, not the
one taken over in a hostile merger.
Recently, major changes have been occurring in the banking sector as the second phase of financial
restructuring starts. Voluntary mergers between sound banks are currently being negotiated.
4.4 Business diversification expanded in the banking industry
Traditionally, there had been strict turf boundaries between the various types of financial business in
Korea, and commercial banks could engage only to a very limited extent in the securities business,
while being in principle prohibited from carrying on insurance business.
More recently, however, there has been strong pressure to ease the business demarcation among
financial institutions. Commercial banks have sought numerous ways to circumvent the boundary lines
by setting up subsidiary companies or entering into cooperative alliances with other related
companies. This new trend is mainly due to the rapid progress both of information technologies and of
securitisation in the financial market.
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Domestic commercial banks had a total of 91 subsidiary companies as at April 2001, of which 11 were
securities-related companies. As of the end of June 1999, moreover, domestic commercial banks had
entered into 265 formal contracts establishing cooperative alliances with other institutions. Of these,
fund transfer contracts numbered 136, accounting for the majority.
Table 5
Status of subsidiaries of commercial banks
Securities
companies
Investment
trust
companies
Insurance
companies
Credit card
Companies
Merchant
banks
Financial
companies
specialising
in loan
business1
others2 Overseassubsidiaries Total
Nationwide
banks 4 7 2 3 2 13 19 31 81
Regional
banks      7 3  10
Total 4 7 2 3 2 20 22 31 91
Notes: 1  Refers to venture capital companies and leasing companies. 2  Refers to economic research institutes, credit information companies,
futures companies, asset management companies, factoring companies, etc.
Table 6
Types of contract for cooperative alliances of commercial banks (June 1999)
Types Details Contents
Funds transfer (136)  Depositing, withdrawing, remitting,
transferring of funds for securities
companies and insurance agencies
Credit card business (44)  Issuing credit cards
 Matters relating to debit cards and
affiliate cards
Electronic banking (21)  Phone banking, firm banking, or
PC banking
Settlement and fund
transfers
Internet shopping mall (2)  Settlement service for trading
through internet shopping mall
Stock trading business (2)  Opening accounts for stock trading
 Depositing and withdrawing funds
for stock trading
Asset management or consultation (15)  Asset management, such as the
management of money in trust
through stock trading
 Consultation
Strategic alliances with
non-banking financial
industries
Insurance business (4)  Insurance services connected with
deposits
Agent service and other
services
Interbanking business cooperation (3)  Business cooperation for
international banking or foreign
exchange transactions
 Joint promotion of business
financing projects
Other services (38)  Subscribing for online services by
proxy
 Selecting competent export
companies and handling related
matters
 Bond collection services
 Selling travellers cheques
 Consulting
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The number of cooperative alliances of financial institutions in 1999 was increasing explosively,
especially between banks and non-banking financial institutions.
Table 7
Trends of strategic alliances of financial institutions
Banks Non-banking financialinstitutions
Between
banks
(A)
Between
banks and
non-
banking
financial
institutions
(B)
Between
banks
and
others
(C)
Sub-
total
Between
non-
banking
financial
institutions
(D)
Between
non-
banking
financial
institutions
and others
(E)
Sub-
total
Between
same
indust-
ries
(A+D)
Between
different
indust-
ries
(B+C+E)
Total
1995  5 7 12 6 15 21 6 27 33
1996   4 4 1 7 8 1 11 12
1997 2 3 4 9 2 3 5 4 10 14
1998 1 1 2 4  1 1 1 4 5
Jan-Aug
1999 3 16 10 29 2 6 8 5 32 37
Total 6 25 27 58 11 32 43 17 84 101
4.5 Internet banking on a sharp rise
Although it is still in its infancy, having begun only one or two years ago, internet banking has been
spreading at an overwhelming speed. All domestic commercial banks have introduced internet
banking and are expanding its scope.
Table 8
Status of internet banking use
March 2000 September 2000
Volume
(thousands)
Value
(trillion won)
Volume
(thousands)
Value
(trillion won)
Information inquiries 3,809  16,670 
Funds transfers 1,005 9.8 2,700 30.1
Loan applications 21 0.2 97 0.9
(Loans executed) () () (24) (0.2)
Total 4,835  19,467 
5. Prospects
The financial holding company system will be the axis of the future domestic financial industry, which
is now rapidly restructuring. The emergence of financial holding companies will reduce the number of
individual financial institutions specialised in specific financial businesses and increase the
permeability of the remaining barriers separating banks, securities firms and insurance companies.
Future financial institutions will be classified as bank holding companies, non-bank holding companies,
affiliated companies or individual companies. They will also be classified as companies concentrating
on the banking business, the securities business or the insurance business.
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Table 9
Transition of financial structure in Korea
Before financial crisis
in late 1997 At present
After allowing bank
holding companies
Banks
Securities companies
Banking focus (banks, merchant
banks, mutual savings and
finance companies, etc)
Bank holding companies
Insurance companies
Investment trust companies
Securities focus (securities
companies, investment trust
companies etc)
Non-bank holding companies
(focusing on insurance and
securities)
Merchant banks
Mutual savings and finance
companies
Insurance focus (life insurance
companies, non-life insurance
companies)
Parent-to-subsidiary or inter-
subsidiary ties
Financial companies
specialising in loan business etc
Others Individual financial institutions
